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Blockchain is increasingly being used to provide a distributed, 
secure, trusted, and private framework for energy trading in 
smart grids. However, existing solutions suffer from lack of 
privacy, processing and packet overheads, and reliance on 
Trusted Third Parties (TTP). To address these challenges, we 
propose a Secure Private Blockchain-based (SPB) framework. 
SPB enables the energy producers and consumers to directly 
negotiate the energy price. To reduce the associated packet 
overhead, we propose a routing method which routes packets 
based on the destination Public Key (PK). SPB eliminates the 
need for TTP by introducing atomic meta-transactions. The two 
transactions that form a meta-transaction are visible to the 
blockchain participants only after both of them are generated. 
Thus, if one of the participants does not commit to its tasks in a 
pre-defined time, then the energy trade expires and the 
corresponding transaction is treated as invalid. The smart meter 
of the consumer confirms receipt of energy by generating an 
Energy Receipt Confirmation (ERC). To verify that the ERC is 
generated by a genuine smart meter, SPB supports 
authentication of anonymous smart meters which in turn 
enhances the privacy of the meter owner. Qualitative security 
analysis shows the resilience of SPB against a range of attacks. 
 
Introduction 
 
The grand challenges of climate change, depletion of fossil fuels, 
and ever-increasing energy demand are driving the 
transformation of energy systems. In the early 21st century, the 
concept of “smart grid” was proposed [1], with the aim of 
increasing efficiency, reliability and robustness. 
The power distribution network which is central to smart grids 
is significantly characterized by high penetration of distributed 
renewable resources, flexible loads, and advanced sensing 
infrastructures. The transformation from a centralized to 
distributed energy generation pattern has led to the emergence 
of energy prosumers (Producers-and-Consumers) [2], who are 
capable of generating and consuming energy simultaneously, 
e.g., a building equipped with solar panels. This naturally raises 
the need for establishing an energy trading mechanism that is 
secure, maintains participant privacy, and fosters energy 
economics in the power distribution network. 
Recently blockchain has attracted tremendous attention as a 
means to provide a secure and anonymous framework for energy 
trading. Blockchain employs changeable Public Keys (PKs) as 
the user identity to provide anonymity. In our recent work [4], a 
blockchain based distributed data storage system is proposed for 
protecting the grid data. Mihaylov et al. [5] propose to convert 
energy to a virtual currency known as NRGcoin which is then 
traded in a blockchain. A centralized Distribution System 
Operator (DSO) monitors the demand and load by collecting 
information from the smart meters of producers and consumers 
and defines the NRGcoin price accordingly. In [6], the authors 
implemented a blockchain information system for microgrid 
called “the Brooklyn microgrid” that demonstrates the potential 
of blockchain to underpin a distributed energy trading market. 
The proposed method in [7] comprises a central repository that 
contains all energy bids and requests in the energy market. To 
ensure the privacy of the energy producers, a mixing service is 
employed that gives a random ID to the produced energy by each 
smart meter. Powerledger [8] proposed a blockchain-based 
energy market that requires users to buy powerledger tokens to 
be able to trade energy. However, the following issues have yet 
to be addressed by the state-of-the-art:  
1) Lack of privacy: All transactions of a user are publicly 
available; thus, critical information about the user such as energy 
consumption or production patterns can be obtained by linking 
multiple identities to the user or by examining the pattern of 
transactions in the same ledger. In most existing works, e.g., [6-
7], the transactions generated by each energy prosumer can be 
tracked as they are either generated using the same PK or are 
linked together in the same ledger.  
2) Reliance on Trusted Third Party (TTP) Brokers: Trading 
energy requires both sides of the transaction to fulfil their 
commitments in the transaction, e.g., the producer must send the 
consumer the energy upon receipt of payment. Achieving this 
level of trust is challenging due to the distributed nature of the 
blockchain. To address this challenge most existing methods 
rely on a TTP [5-8] and are therefore partially distributed. The 
TTP is susceptible to typical issues arising from centralization 
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including a single point of failure, bottlenecks, etc. Additionally, 
the privacy of the participating entities may be compromised by 
the TTP as it has a complete view of all actions performed in the 
network.  In [13] the authors proposed a new concept known as 
atomic swap which enables exchanging different 
cryptocurrencies in multiple blockchains without requiring 
exchange servers (TTP). Instead, both buyer and seller pay coin 
(in their respective blockchain) to a smart contract. Following, 
the contract transfers the exchanged coin to the buyer’s account. 
However, this method incurs processing overhead and delay in 
coin exchange as four transactions must be mined, i.e., stored, in 
the blockchain for one exchange. A similar method is used in [9] 
for trading goods. Assume that Alice wishes to purchase a book 
from Bob. Alice creates a smart contract that serves as the TTP. 
Bob then pays agreed price to the contract. The contract 
maintains the received coin till Bob confirms receipt of the book. 
Although this method enables trading goods without a TTP, each 
trade requires at least three transactions: i) the smart contract, ii) 
the transaction generated by the buyer to pay to the smart 
contract, and iii) the transaction generated by the smart contract 
to pay either the seller, when the trade is successful, or the buyer, 
in case of dispute. This incurs processing and packet overheads 
in the network and increases the delay for trading goods, thus 
may not be scalable for large-scale smart grid networks of the 
future.  
3) Blockchain overhead: Despite its benefits, blockchain 
consumes significant amount of computational, energy, and 
bandwidth resources as: i) appending (i.e., mining) a new block 
involves solving a resource consuming puzzle (e.g., proof of 
work (POW)), ii) all communications are broadcast to all nodes 
which increases overheads for direct negotiation between nodes. 
Ethereum employs Whisper [10] routing protocol that enables 
direct communications between multiple parties by adding 
destination and source fields to the transactions. However, 
Whisper broadcasts the transaction with only the destination 
node accepting it. 
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a Secure 
Private Blockchain-based platform (SPB) to address the 
aforementioned challenges. Our solution can be used by pure 
consumers, pure producers, and prosumers. The key novel 
features of SPB are:  
i) A routing method on top of the blockchain,  
ii) A pure distributed trading method by introducing 
atomic meta-transactions, and 
iii) A private authentication method to verify smart 
meters.   
We first propose a new private negotiation framework that can 
be used by producers and consumers to negotiate the price of 
energy. To reduce communication overheads of negotiation 
compared to conventional blockchains, SPB proposes a new 
private routing algorithm that enables direct messaging in 
blockchain. SPB runs over a public blockchain, where anyone 
can join and participate in blockchain, and does not require any 
participating node to buy assets or deposit money to trade 
energy. SPB ensures security in the energy trading process using 
“atomic meta-transactions”. Atomic meta-transactions are an 
adaptation of atomic swaps for energy trading which improves 
performance by reducing the associated processing overhead 
and delay. In an atomic meta-transaction, a constituent 
transaction is considered to be valid if and only if it is coupled 
with at least one other transaction. Once a price is agreed on, the 
consumer generates and broadcasts a Commit To Pay (CTP) 
transaction, committing to pay a specific amount of money to 
the producer. Unlike the state-of-the-art approaches, the 
consumer does not pay to the smart contract. Instead CTP 
freezes a specific amount of money in the customer account till 
the producer transfers energy to the consumer. Once energy is 
transferred, the consumer’s smart meter generates an Energy 
Receipt Confirmation (ERC) transaction. The producer is paid 
by the smart contract after the ERC is verified. The blockchain 
participants must be able to ensure that an ERC transaction is 
signed by a genuine smart meter. Additionally, the generated 
ERC must remain unlinked to the previous transactions, 
otherwise the transactions can be tracked which may expose 
privacy-sensitive information about the consumer. To address 
this challenge, SPB introduces a Certificate of Existence (CoE). 
Each smart meter constructs a Merkle tree of a number of PKs 
and sends the root of the tree to a smart meter to sign which 
serves as the CoE. To use the CoE, the smart meter must sign 
transactions with the private key corresponding to one of the 
PKs in the Merkle tree. Our platform is fully decentralized 
whereby both entities involved in the trade will receive their 
benefit (money or electricity) once they perform their respective 
task, without relying on a TTP.   
SPB: Secure Private Blockchain-based Platform  
In SPB, the participating nodes in the smart grid including 
energy producers, consumers, prosumers, and distribution 
companies manage the blockchain by storing and verifying 
transactions and blocks. We assume that smart meters are 
tamper-resistant.  To reduce the blockchain processing 
overhead, a lightweight consensus algorithm, e.g., Distributed 
Time-based Consensus (DTC) proposed in our previous work 
[11], is used. In DTC, each miner waits for a random time prior 
to mining a block, instead of solving a computationally 
demanding puzzle. Moreover, each miner can only mine one 
block within a designated consensus_period. 
The ledger of transactions created by a producer serves as its 
energy account. To establish an energy account, the producer 
must create a genesis transaction. The genesis transaction can be 
generated by [11]: i) burning specific amount of coin, e.g., 
Bitcoin, meaning paying specific amount of money to an 
unknown address, or ii) receiving a certificate from trusted 
entities such as energy distributors. This prevents malicious 
nodes from creating fake energy accounts intending to flood the 
network with fake energy trading requests. Users can employ 
multiple energy accounts to protect against malicious nodes 
which may analyze the pattern of transactions in a ledger to 
obtain privacy-sensitive information about users which in turn 
may lead to user de-anonymization. Although generating 
multiple energy accounts increases the user anonymity and thus 
ensures a level of privacy, it requires the user to pay for either 
each additional genesis transaction or certificate. Furthermore, 
the user would be burdened with managing the keys used for 
multiple energy accounts. Thus, there is a tradeoff between 
increasing privacy and cost and overheads.  
Each network participant can add energy to his energy account 
by generating a supply_energy transaction, which includes:  
“T_ID || P_T_ID || energy_amount || energy_price || 
negotiatable || PK || sign” 
T_ID is the unique identifier of the transaction, which is the hash 
of the transaction. P_T_ID is the identifier of the previous 
transaction generated by the same node and ensures that the user 
knows the public/private keys associated with an energy 
account, and thus has once generated a genesis transaction. The 
next two fields specify the amount and price of the energy. The 
negotiatable flag statues identifies whether the price is 
negotiable. Finally, the PK and signature of the user are 
populated in the transaction. The supply_energy transaction is 
sent to a smart contract which adds energy to the account of 
energy producer. 
Our framework consists of two main phases namely: 1) 
Negotiation: which enables negotiation of the price of the 
energy, and 2) Energy Trading: which enables private energy 
trading. The two phases are explained below.  
Phase1) Negotiation  
The negotiation is conducted using the negotiation transaction, 
which includes:  
“T_ID || energy_account.PK || price || status” 
where T_ID is the identity of the transaction, 
energy_account.PK is the PK of the energy account with which 
the consumer wishes to negotiate. The price field is the offered 
price by the consumer. The status field can be either ‘1’ or ‘0’, 
indicating that the offer is accepted or rejected by the producer, 
respectively. A producer that receives the negotiation 
transaction, can accept the request by setting status to ‘1’ or offer 
another price (status set to ‘0’). Thus, the producer and consumer 
may directly exchange negotiation transactions till they agree on 
the price. The negotiation transactions are not stored in the 
blockchain as they form intermediate communications between 
the two parties. The final negotiated price is later included in 
energy trading transactions as outlined in Phase 2.  
Recall that in conventional energy trading approaches, 
transactions are typically broadcast which incurs packet 
overheads and delays for processing negotiation between nodes. 
To address this challenge, we propose an Anonymous Routing 
Backbone (ARB). The participating nodes in blockchain which 
have sufficient resources, e.g., substations or controller centers, 
serve as the backbone nodes which are responsible for routing 
negotiation transactions to the destination. Unlike traditional 
networks where participating nodes are known by their Internet 
Protocol (IP) address, blockchain participants are known by their 
PK. Thus, ARB is based on the PK of the nodes, meaning that 
packets are routed toward specific PKs. The backbone nodes 
route transactions based on the X most significant bytes of the 
PK of the destination, known as Routing Bytes (RB). The 
backbone nodes initialize a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), such 
as the example in Figure 1, that identifies the corresponding 
backbone node to each value of RB. The value of X is influenced 
by the total number of backbone nodes and the total load, i.e., 
transactions that need to be routed. In small backbones, X is very 
small (e.g., X=1 in Figure 1), while for larger backbone X 
increases. If a backbone node is overloaded by transactions, then 
the backbone nodes reconstruct the hash table and update RB to 
a larger value. Thus, the number of transactions that arrive at 
each backbone node, i.e., match with RB of each backbone node, 
will reduce. It is worth noting that although increasing the RB 
reduces the load, it does not guarantee balancing the load 
between backbone nodes as the most significant bytes in PK are 
randomly generated. Participating nodes in the blockchain 
associate with the backbone nodes based on their PK which is 
detailed in the rest of this section. The backbone nodes use 
conventional routing protocols to route transactions toward 
destination, e.g., OSPF [RFC2328].  
Figure 1. An illustrative example of ARB and the corresponding hash table.  
When the backbone is formed, all nodes in the 
blockchain, referred to as regular nodes in the rest of 
the paper, are notified of the DHT. Each regular node 
then associates with the backbone node that handles 
transactions for its PK.  Since a regular node may 
employ multiple PKs, it may be associated with 
multiple backbone nodes, e.g. node 8 in Figure 1. For 
each of its PKs, the regular node joins the backbone 
node by sending a join message to the backbone node, 
which is signed with the private key corresponding to 
the PK. This protects against malicious nodes that 
falsely claim to be another node as only the genuine 
node knows the private key for signing a message. 
The backbone nodes are responsible for forwarding 
transactions to the regular nodes that are associated 
with them. Regular nodes use the IP address of the 
backbone nodes to send transactions as shown in 
Figure 1. However, the backbone nodes use the 
destination PK of the received transaction to determine the 
destination node and the corresponding IP address, to decide on 
which path this transaction must be forwarded along. Compared 
to traditional IP-based routing, ARB incurs a small processing 
overhead at the backbone nodes for looking up the destination 
PK. To protect against malicious nodes that may monitor the IP 
address of transactions to deanonymize a user, mechanisms such 
as Tor can be used for anonymization between regular and ARB 
nodes.  
To negotiate with a producer, the consumer sends an offer with 
its suggested price and energy requirement. The negotiation 
message is sent to one of the backbone nodes and is subsequently 
routed to the producer. The response message from the producer 
follows the same process but in the reverse direction towards the 
consumer. The maximum number of offers and counteroffers 
that can be generated is limited to a certain threshold, offer_limit. 
The latter is a value defined by the system designer based on the 
application that prevents malicious nodes from launching a 
denial of service attack by sending a large number of negotiation 
messages. 
Phase2) Energy Trading  
After negotiations (if any), the consumer and the producer 
commence the energy trading process. We eliminate the need for 
a TTP, which is common to conventional energy trading 
methods, by introducing atomic meta-transactions based on 
atomic swaps [12]. An atomic process is an indivisible operation 
which appears to the rest of the system to occur at once without 
being interrupted. We define two transactions that together form 
atomic meta-transactions, such that they are valid if and only if 
both transactions are generated within a specific time period. A 
single transaction is not valid by itself. 
The atomic meta-transaction process is outlined in Figure 2. The 
first transaction is generated by the consumer to commit 
payment of the price agreed with the producer, and thus is known 
as Commit To Pay (CTP) transaction. The CTP is a payment 
transaction that pays a specific amount of money to another user, 
which is the producer. However, CTP payment has pending 
status meaning that the consumer cannot spend the money 
committed in CTP, because the money has not yet been 
transferred to the producer’s account. The CTP is not mined in 
the blockchain. Each miner maintains a database of pending 
CTPs, which is used for verification. To ensure the consistency 
of the CTP database among blockchain participants, a new 
header field is introduced for blocks named “CTP hash”. The 
latter is populated by each miner with the hash of its CTP 
database copy. The issue of maintaining consistency among the 
CTP databases at the miners is similar to ensuring that the local 
blockchain copies at these nodes are consistent. The CTP 
database reduces delay and processing overheads for trading 
energy compared to conventional blockchain-based solutions as 
the CTP transaction does not need to be mined. To secure SPB 
against double spending, where a malicious node pays the same 
amount of coin to multiple users, we propose an approach for 
transaction verification which is different to conventional 
blockchains. In the latter, the miners verify a payment 
transaction by ensuring that the amount of money being spent is 
less than or equal to the amount of money that the user has in his 
account. However, in the case of SPB, the miners check if the 
amount of money to be spent is less than the sum of the amount 
of money in the user’s account in blockchain and the CTP 
database.  
The structure of CTP transaction is as follows:  
 “T_ID || Time Stamp || Expiry Time|| Price || Contract Hash || 
PK || Sign” 
T_ID is the transaction identifier. Time Stamp is the time when 
the transaction is generated. Each CTP transaction can only be 
stored by the miners for a specific period of time, which is 
indicated in the Expiry Time field. This ensures that if the 
producer does not send energy to the consumer, the pending 
money of the consumer will be returned to his account after the 
expiry time.  Price denotes the money that needs to be 
transferred between producer and the consumer. Contract Hash 
Figure 2. The process of atomic meta-transactions.  
is the hash of the amount and rate of energy that the producer 
and consumer have agreed on (either by negotiation or directly). 
The final two fields are the PK and signature of the consumer. 
The consumer signs the hash of the entire transaction to ensure 
integrity.  
Once the CTP is broadcast, the producer (as a member of the 
network) receives the transaction and compares the contract hash 
with its own contract hash, which is stored locally, to ensure the 
consumer has not changed the amount or rate of the energy. To 
ensure privacy of both producer and consumer, rather than 
including the exact amount and rate of energy, a hash is used. 
Next, the producer begins delivering energy to the smart meter 
of the consumer. Once all of the energy is delivered, the 
consumer’s smart meter generates an Energy Receipt 
Confirmation (ERC) transaction. The network participants need 
to verify that a node that claims to be a meter is genuine to 
protect against malicious activities. Conversely, the meter must 
remain private as it reveals sensitive information including 
electricity usage of its owner. To address this challenge, we 
propose a method to anonymously verify a smart meter without 
revealing the true identity of the meter using a Certificate of 
Existence (CoE). Figure 3 provides a summary of CoE 
generation and verification process which are elaborated below. 
The manufacturer of each meter creates a private/public key pair 
for each smart meter (known as M-PK-/M-PK+ respectively) and 
serves as the Certified Authority (CA) for the M-PK+ of all the 
meters. Once the smart meters are deployed, each meter 
produces a number of public/private keys (step (1)). The smart 
meter owner determines the number of keys required depending 
on the level of anonymity desired. A large pool of key pairs can 
achieve higher anonymity, as transactions which are generated 
using the same key can be linked thus revealing energy usage 
patterns. Instead when multiple keys are used, the energy usage 
history of the user is split in different ledgers which have no 
mutual links, thus making the aforementioned inferences 
difficult. After generating the key pairs, the smart meter 
constructs a Merkle tree (2) by recursively hashing the PKs 
which are stored as the leaves of a tree as shown in Figure 4. The 
PKs in the Merkle tree and their corresponding private keys are 
later used to privately create ERC transaction, as outlined in the 
rest of this section. A key feature of Merkle tree is that the 
existence of a leaf can be proved with small overhead. As an 
illustrative example, to prove the existence of ‘A’ in the Merkle 
tree shown in Figure 4, one must store HB and HCD locally and 
reveal them to prove existence. To verify the existence, HA is 
hashed by HB, and the result is then hashed by HCD. If the final 
hash matches with HABCD, then the existence of ‘A’ is confirmed.   
The meter generates a Verification Request (VR) with the 
following fields:  
Root || M-PK+ || Sign 
Where Root is root hash of the Merkle tree encrypted with the 
M-PK+ of a randomly chosen smart meter, known as Verifier 
Meter (VM). The second field is the M-PK+ of the meter that 
generates VR, followed by Sign that is the signed hash of the VR 
by M-PK-. Once populated, the meter routes VR to the VM using 
the proposed routing method (3). On receiving the Merkle tree 
root, the VM first verifies the smart meter, that has generated the 
root, using its M-PK+ and the CA of the manufacturer (4). If 
Figure 3. A summary of CoE generation and usage process. 
verified, it signs the received root using its M-PK- (5) and returns 
the signed root back to the smart meter of which initially sent the 
transaction. The signed root of the Merkle tree is used as the 
CoE.  
In order to generate the ERC transaction, the smart meter adopts 
one of the keys used to construct the Merkle tree in CoE as the 
identity of the ERC transaction (6). The structure of ERC 
transaction is as follows:  
“T_ID || Time Stamp || CTP_ID || Price || CoE || CoE_PK || 
Merkle hashes || PK|| Sign” 
The first two fields are the same as the CTP transaction. The 
CTP_ID refers to the ID of the corresponding CTP transaction 
that is used by the miners to verify the ERC transaction as 
discussed below. Price denotes the total price of the contract. 
The CoE is as discussed above. The CoE_PK contains the PK of 
the VM used for verification of the CoE using CA. Merkle 
hashes are the hashes that are required to prove the existence of 
the PK used to generate the ERC transaction in the Merkle tree 
(7). Finally, the last two fields are the PK of the ERC generator 
and its corresponding signature (8). 
On receiving the ERC transaction, the miners verify the 
transaction by: a) verifying that the CTP_ID exists in the list of 
pending transactions (9), b) matching the price of the current 
transaction with the CTP price (10), c) verifying the signature 
and PK of the VM using the manufacturer CA (11), d) verifying 
the existence of PK used to generate the transaction in the 
Merkle tree (12), and e) matching the PK hash in the Merkle tree 
with the signature on the transaction (13). If the above steps are 
successfully performed, then the ERC is validated. The ERC 
triggers the smart contract to pay the agreed price to the 
producer. The smart contract cannot be triggered if even one of 
the steps is not successful and the CTP transaction of the 
consumer is removed from the CTP database after the expiry 
time. 
To demonstrate the use of SPB by end users, we implemented 
the core SPB functions using smart contracts in Ethereum. A 
video demonstration is available at [14]. Since we have used 
Ethereum for this demonstration, optimization methods 
employed by SPB are not accommodated, e.g., CTP is stored in 
the blockchain instead of a CTP database.  
 
Security and Privacy Analysis  
In this section, we discuss the security and privacy of SPB.  
Privacy: We study the privacy of SPB from the perspective of 
the producer, consumer, and the consumer’s smart meter. The 
producer can employ multiple energy accounts which protect 
him from being tracked. The consumer and his smart meter 
employ changeable PKs for communicating with multiple users 
to enhance his anonymity and thus provide a level of privacy.  
Recall that CoE is proposed to protect the privacy of the 
consumer. There is no link between the VM and the actual smart 
meter that is using the CoE as VM is selected randomly by the 
smart meter. Each meter may sign multiple CoEs for other smart 
meters. Consequently, tracking the CoEs signed by particular 
meters will not compromise the privacy. The smart meter 
changes the PK used for each ERC transaction, thus, protecting 
against potential tracking by malicious nodes.   
The Merkle tree in a CoE may be used by a single meter or by 
multiple meters that protect against malicious nodes who track a 
particular CoE.  
Security: The security of SPB draws on the inherent security 
features of blockchain. Each transaction contains the hash of 
either the contract or the whole transaction that ensures integrity.  
We discuss below the key attacks possible in SPB:  
Malicious producer: A malicious producer may not deliver 
energy to the consumer after the consumer generates CTP. In 
this case, the smart meter does not generate the corresponding 
ERC transaction as energy is not received. The CTP transaction 
will be discarded from CTP database by the expiry time and the 
consumer’s money will be released.  
Malicious consumer: The malicious consumer cannot receive 
energy without paying the producer as the energy transfer can 
only be triggered by a valid CTP. Recall that it is assumed that 
smart meters are tamper-resistant and thus it is impossible to 
generate a fake ERC transaction. 
CoE attack: The malicious node pretends to be a smart meter 
by using the CoE of a genuine smart meter. ERC transaction is 
signed by one of the keys in the Merkle tree. Thus, the malicious 
node must possess the private key corresponding to one of the 
keys in the Merkle tree which are only known by genuine smart 
meters.  
 
Conclusion  
We proposed a Secure Private Blockchain-based framework 
(SPB), that enables energy prosumers to negotiate over the 
energy price and trade energy in a distributed manner. SPB 
employed a routing method for forwarding negotiation traffic, 
thus reducing the associated packet overhead compared to 
existing approaches. SPB eliminated the need for TTP using 
atomic meta-transactions. Smart meters are verified using 
Certificate of Existence (CoE) without revealing information 
about the previous transactions of the same meter which in turn 
enhanced user privacy. Security analysis showed the robustness 
of SPB against several attacks. In the future, we aim to 
Figure 4. The structure of a Merkle tree. 
implement SPB on real devices and benchmark its performance; 
we are also working on developing more Blockchain based 
applications in the smart grid domain.    
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